Introduction
Whether representing a complainant or a respondent in a human rights matter, it is important to be aware of the many bases upon which human rights complaints may be either dismissed entirely or partially through summary proceedings. In light of the inability of human rights tribunals to award costs to the successful party, 1 it is especially important for counsel to take a long, hard look at the means by which the complaint may be dealt with most efficiently and expeditiously. Even if they do not result in a dismissal of the complaint, motions for preliminary decisions may be very helpful in "clearing the procedural underbrush" that may delay and unnecessarily complicate human rights proceedings.
2 Clarifying the parameters of the complaint well before preparation for the hearing or the investigation may result in a significant reduction in time, resources and headaches! Tribunals and other human rights bodies have express provisions in their legislation granting them the power to deal with allegations and complaints on a summary basis. It is important, however, to be aware of the most recent case law interpreting those provisions as this can make a significant difference in the way one approaches the motion.
The scope of this paper is limited to motions for preliminary dismissal of human rights complaints in two jurisdictions: the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and the Canadian Human Rights Commission/Tribunal.
PART ONE Summary Dismissal at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Since July 2008, Ontario has had a "direct access" human rights tribunal. enable the Tribunal to deal with applications on a summary basis. 4 These new provisions are discussed in detail below.
There are essentially four ways in which an application may be challenged on a preliminary, or early basis: (1) the HRTO may initiate its own inquiry into its jurisdiction under Rule 13 of the Rules; (2) a respondent may bring a Request under Rule 19 for an order during proceedings requesting that the Application be summarily dismissed on various grounds; (3) a respondent or the HRTO may initiate a summary hearing under the new Rule 19A on the question of whether there is a reasonable prospect of success; and (4) a respondent may make a motion for non-suit at the hearing after the applicant has presented her/his case.
Each of these options and the grounds for requesting summary dismissal will be examined below.
We also consider the status of HRTO proceedings when judicial review of a preliminary ruling is sought. For ease of reading, all references to statutory provisions are to the Code, and all references to rules are to the Rules of the HRTO.
Requests for Early Dismissal Under Rules 13 and 19
Pursuant to Rule 13.1, the HRTO may summarily dismiss an application that is outside of its jurisdiction on its own motion. Prior to dismissing an application under this rule, the HRTO must send a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to the applicant, thus giving the applicant an opportunity to file written submissions in support of his or her application.
An application will only be dismissed under Rule 13.1 if it is "plain and obvious" that the application falls outside of the HRTO's jurisdiction. 5 In practice, this means that an applicant must establish that it is at least possible that the subject matter of the application comes within the HRTO's jurisdiction. This is a low threshold for an applicant to meet at the preliminary stage.
If the HRTO refuses to dismiss an application under Rule 13, this does not mean the end of any jurisdictional concerns for the applicant
6
. It simply means that the HRTO cannot decide the jurisdictional issue without hearing evidence from the parties.
If a respondent wishes to raise a preliminary objection to the Tribunal's jurisdiction, or request that the application be dismissed on a preliminary basis for any reason, this must be done by means of a Rule 19 Request for an Order During Proceedings.
Generally, a respondent must file a full response to an application prior to raising any preliminary objections or making a Request for an Order. However, where a respondent alleges in a Rule 19
Request, that: (a) the issues in dispute come under exclusive federal jurisdiction; (b) a full and final release has been signed by the parties; (c) a civil court proceeding has been commenced requesting a remedy based on the alleged human rights infringement; or (d) a complaint has been filed with the Commission, the respondent need only provide the relevant documents (i.e.
complaint, statement of claim, release) and is not required to respond to the allegations. 7 The respondent must however provide full argument in support of its position that the application should be dismissed.
We will examine the bases for arguing that an application is outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction below.
The Bases for Summary Dismissal
A respondent to a human rights application can object to the HRTO's jurisdiction to deal with the application, for many reasons. Predominately, these reasons fall within the following categories, each of which are explained in detail below: The substance of the application has been dealt with by a previous proceeding; and 7 Issue estoppel and abuse of process.
Constitutional jurisdiction
The HRTO has the power to consider the constitutional division of power under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867
8
. It will also consider constitutional jurisprudence that has 7 Masood, see note 5, at paras. 8 and 9.
8 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 determined whether a particular industry or practice is governed federally or provincially. 9 For example, the HRTO has dismissed an application where the employer provided inter-provincial transport services on a regularly scheduled basis and was therefore a federal undertaking.
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Similarly, where the respondent to an application provided investment and securities services, not banking services, the HRTO found it had jurisdiction under the "property and civil rights" head of power in section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
A determination of whether provincial or federal human rights legislation applies to an activity is based on whether the industries, undertakings or activities with which these liberties are connected, are themselves within the legislative power of Parliament or a provincial legislature.
11
The general rule is that labour relations, including human rights in the employment context, will fall within provincial jurisdiction unless the nature of the business or undertaking's operations and normal activities can be characterized as federal in nature.
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The Code will not apply to "services, goods and facilities" which are part of the "core" of a federal work or undertaking to the extent that the application of the Code is incompatible with the doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity or federal paramountcy. spending power since it would permit the HRTO to dictate to the federal government how the spending power could be exercised. This, the Court found, was not permitted under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Therefore, the provincial human rights legislation did not apply.
Geographical jurisdiction
A respondent may object to an application on the basis that the alleged events occurred outside of Ontario. A good example of this type of jurisdictional issue is found in Hughes . . Wherein the HRTO summarily dismissed the application. 15 The applicant was residing in Quebec, her regular place of employment was in Quebec, and her employer's regular place of business was in Quebec. The HRTO considered whether or not the application had a sufficient connection to
Ontario to come within the Code and determined that the "pith and substance" of the acts complained of did not relate to matters within Ontario. It did not matter that the respondent's head office was in Ontario or that clients of the respondent were located in Ontario. Thus the application was summarily dismissed.
The application falls outside of the Code
The Code is very specific and, as such, does not extend to every situation where a person feels that he or she has been aggrieved. Although an applicant may feel that he or she has been subjected to unfair treatment, unless that treatment would constitute a discriminatory practice under the Code, the HRTO does not have jurisdiction to address it.
The Code is limited to protecting people in Ontario from discrimination and harassment in the areas of employment; housing; goods, services and facilities; contracts; membership in trade and vocational associations; and reprisals based on filing a human rights complaint. Therefore, in order to be within the jurisdiction of the HRTO, the alleged discrimination must be in relation to one of these areas.
One of the issues that often comes up is whether the alleged discrimination occurred with respect to "services". Although the HRTO has held that "services" under the Code must be given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation, 16 the Tribunal has held that the following situations did not involve a "service" under the Code:
 the content and result of an adjudicative decision-maker's decision;  the content of a newspaper editorial;
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 the inscription on a monument erected on church property;
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Conversely, the HRTO held in Oliver v. Hamilton (City) 20 that the issuance of a Mayoral proclamation was a "service" pursuant to the Code. The HRTO stated at paragraph 34:
Issuing a proclamation is a service because it is generally perceived in the community as being a benefit to the groups that seek it, and therefore it should be seen as a legitimate privilege to which citizens have access without fear of discrimination.
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A more fulsome analysis of the tests to be applied in determining whether an activity constitutes a "service" is provided in the part of this paper that deals with the federal Commission and
Tribunal.
Questions may also be raised as to whether the applicant is in an employment relationship with the Respondent. However, the courts and tribunals have been unwilling to use technical definitions of "employment" to rule out employment relationships for the purposes of provincial and federal anti-discrimination laws. 22 
Timeliness
Under subsection 34(1) of the Code, an applicant must file his or her application within one year of the incident that is alleged to form the basis for the Code violation, or within one year of the last incident if there is a "series of incidents". 27 If the applicant has not met this timeline, the Tribunal will only have jurisdiction to consider the out-of-time incidents if the applicant can show under subsection 34(2) of the Code that the delay was incurred in good faith and that no substantial prejudice will result to any party because of the delay.
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The HRTO has stated that there are two basic requirements for a group of incidents to constitute a "series" within the meaning of the section. First, there cannot be significant gaps between the incidents. It has been held, on more than one occasion, that a gap of more than one year between incidents in a series would, in most cases, interrupt the series
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. Second, there must be some connection or nexus between the incidents that form a series. In numerous decisions interpreting 34(1)(b), the Tribunal has considered the nature of the events and whether they may reasonably be viewed as a pattern of conduct, or are comprised of incidents relating to discrete and separate issues without some connection or nexus
30
. When alleging that incidents that would normally be out of time be actually part of a series, the applicant must provide sufficient particulars for the Tribunal to come to that conclusion. An applicant cannot create a nexus between separate incidents simply by making the bold statement that the incidents are part of a pattern of discrimination.
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If a series of incidents is not found by the HRTO, then all incidents that are alleged to have taken place one year prior to the filing of the application are considered out of time. However, the HRTO may still exercise its discretion to hear the allegations relating to out of time incidents provided it is satisfied that there was a good faith reason for the delay and no substantial prejudice will result to any affected party. The HRTO has held that a good faith delay is a very high onus to meet 32 and has only been met when the applicant has established that he or she was 27 Code, see note 3, section 34(1)(a). Section 45.1 -the substance of the application has been dealt with by a previous proceeding Section 45.1 provides that the Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or part, if it is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. Relying on these underlying principles leads to the Tribunal asking itself whether there was concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues; whether the previously decided legal issue was essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal; and whether there was an opportunity for the complainants or their privies to know the case to be met and have the chance to meet it, regardless of how closely the previous process procedurally mirrored the one the Tribunal prefers or uses itself. All of these questions go to determining whether the substance of a complaint has been "appropriately dealt with". At the end of the day, it is really a question of whether it makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute.
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In the Figliola case, the Court found that the complainants were simply trying to relitigate the 
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The HRTO has confirmed that there are two distinct aspects to this provision. First, it must determine whether there was another "proceeding"; second, it must determine whether or not that proceeding "appropriately dealt with the substance of the application."
51

What is a "proceeding"?
The HRTO has commented that for the purposes of section 45.1 a "proceeding" includes an When has the substance of an application been "appropriately dealt with"? Once it has been determined that the previous adjudicative process was a "proceeding" for the purposes of section 45.1, it must be determined if that proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. This does not mean that the HRTO must find it would have reached the same conclusion as the decision in the prior proceeding. 64 Rather, the HRTO will consider whether the application before it arises from the same set of facts that provided the basis for the other proceeding, whether the substance of the issues raised in each forum was substantially the same and whether the matter raised was "appropriately dealt with" in the other proceeding. 63 The HRTO has on several occasions found that a settlement was a "proceeding" under section 45. A similar analysis can be found in Campbell. 68 There, the HRTO held that the Employment Standards Officer ("ESO") had appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. Key to the HRTO's finding was that the main issue in both the application before it and the Employment Standards Act ("ESA") complaint was differential treatment due to pregnancy. The HRTO was satisfied that the ESO had considered these allegations and applied human rights concepts in reaching her decision. Further, the ESA itself contained anti-discrimination provisions. Thus, the HRTO was satisfied that the substance of the application had been appropriately dealt with.
In was not discriminatory. The HRTO acknowledged that the substance of all of the applicant's complaints were dealt with by the HPARB, but that the HPARB did not apply the principles of undue hardship and adverse impact and did not reflect those principles in its reasons. The Court found that the HRTO failed to recognize that the HPARB had a public protection mandate, which meant that it was required to determine the degree of accommodation that was appropriate in that context. The Court held that the HRTO had no expertise in protecting public health and should not assume jurisdiction in order to substitute its statutory mandate for the mandate of another tribunal having responsibility and expertise in that area. The Court found that the HRTO had effectively permitted the complainant to launch a collateral attack on the HPARB decision, which it was not permitted to do.
As the above examples demonstrate, section 45.1 is a very broad ground for obtaining summary dismissal of an application. Given that Snow has been consistently followed, 73 this decision is analyzed in detail below. In Snow, the respondent Honda asserted that the HRTO was barred from considering the complaint by virtue of the doctrines of issue estoppel and/or abuse of process. Honda argued that prior to the complaint being filed with the OHRC, the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board ("WSIB") had determined that Honda could not accommodate the complainant. Honda alleged that the human rights complaint was an attempt to re-litigate this decision of the WSIB.
According to Vice Chair Joachim, the rationale for the doctrine of issue estoppel is the need for finality in decision-making. A party should not be twice "vexed" by the same issue. However, as this is a common law doctrine, there has been some hesitation by human rights tribunals to apply it. Vice Chair Joachim explained that the concern is that summary dismissal of a complaint deprives the parties of the opportunity to have their case heard on the merits by a tribunal that specializes in adjudication of human rights disputes. Therefore, the Vice Chair felt that it was appropriate to use caution and restraint when applying issue estoppel.
Vice Chair Joachim went on to examine the three required elements for the application of issue estoppel. These are:
1 The same questions are being decided in both proceedings. The determination of the issue in the first proceeding must have been necessary to the result of that proceeding; that is, issue estoppel only covers fundamental issues determined in the first proceeding. 
2
The judicial decision that is said to create the estoppel must be a final decision. If there is a process of appeal or reconsideration of that decision that the party does not utilize, the decision can be considered final.
3
The parties, or their privies, must be the same for both proceedings. Where the parties are not the same, this part of the test can still be met if one party was the privy of another in the previous proceeding. In order to be a privy, there must be a sufficient degree of common interest between the party and the privy to make it fair to bind the party to the determination made in the previous proceeding.
In Snow, the doctrine of issue estoppel was held not to apply as none of the elements noted above were met. The WSIB did not render a decision as to whether the worker could be accommodated, it simply referred him to the Labour Market Re-Entry Program. Moreover, the parties to the proceedings were not the same and the issue was not the same -the WSIB Applying the above factors, Vice Chair Joachim held that it would not be an abuse of process to continue with the complaint, despite the WSIB proceedings. She held that in an appropriate case, a WSIB decision that a worker cannot be accommodated may prevent the employee from relitigating the same issue before the HRTO. However in the case at bar, given that no formal decision had been made by the WSIB, and that the WSIB had not considered whether the applicant's termination was tainted by discrimination and whether there had been any harassment, it would not be an abuse of process to continue with the complaint.
A common ground for a claim of abuse of process is that a settlement has been reached between the parties, covering the subject matter of the human rights application. The HRTO has indicated a willingness to summarily dismiss such applications where it is satisfied that the applicant entered into the settlement willingly and knowingly, and there was no duress or untoward conduct by the respondent in obtaining the settlement. 81 In fact, the HRTO has dismissed applications on this basis even if the settlement did not involve a full and final release. For example, in Messiah v. Snap-on Tools of Canada, 82 the HRTO held that the absence of reference to a "release" was not determinative. Rather, the question was whether it would be unfair to permit the application to continue having regard to the terms of the memorandum of settlement and the surrounding circumstances. Given that the memorandum of settlement provided that the parties wished to resolve "all outstanding issues" with respect to the applicant's "employment and resignation form employment," this was sufficiently broad to make it unfair to proceed with the application. Similarly, in Dunn, 83 the HRTO commented that the absence of a release did not determine the issue of whether the application should be dismissed. Requiring a specific release of Code claims where these claims were specifically raised in the other proceeding would defeat the purposes of section 45.1 and focus on form over substance.
In N.P. v. Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, 84 the respondent raised a number of preliminary objections to the application, including that aspects of it were an abuse of process.
Citing Snow, Vice Chair Flaherty ruled in favour of the respondents and dismissed a portion of the application as being an abuse of process. The parties to the application had been involved in a defamation action wherein the trial judge had made a finding of fact that the applicant had not been injured in an incident that took place at her school. At the HRTO, the applicant again raised this injury in the context of a claim of discrimination. Vice Chair Flaherty held that the applicant was seeking to relitigate the trial judge's finding of fact regarding the injury and dismissed this part of the application, despite the fact that the trial judge had not considered any allegations of discrimination.
One final example of the HRTO dismissing an application on the ground that it would be an abuse of process is Henderson, 85 Again, the HRTO followed the principles set out in Snow 86 .
The applicant in this case had previously filed a complaint under the Employment Standards Act.
The applicant had deliberately withheld two key concerns from this complaint, in the belief that the HRTO could award more significant damages on these issues. The HRTO took the view that this was a deliberate attempt to split the applicant's case and provide two opportunities to litigate claims of discrimination against the respondents. It would have been an abuse of process for the HRTO to consider these new allegations and they were summarily dismissed.
Summary hearings
Rule 19A.1 provides that:
The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
(emphasis added)
A summary hearing can take place in person or by teleconference. The HRTO will send the parties a Notice of Summary Hearing, indicating which format the hearing will take. The HRTO's Rules with respect to disclosure of documents and witnesses do not apply to summary hearings. Rather, the HRTO can give directions about the steps the parties must take prior to or at the summary hearing, including with respect to documents and witnesses. Given that the summary hearing takes place at a very preliminary stage in an application, the HRTO must be conscious of the fact that evidence which is disclosed through the disclosure process may assist the applicant in establishing the link between the evidence and the Code. The HRTO must therefore consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence could lead to a finding of discrimination.
In Leopold v. YMCA of Greater Toronto 90 it was held that it was not enough for an applicant to simply state that the evidence will show discrimination. The applicant must be able to articulate how the evidence will show discrimination. As the Tribunal explained further in Forde v.
Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario:
The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal's process, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code or the intention by a respondent to commit a reprisal for asserting one's Code rights. hearings can be used at any time during a hearing, and not just at the preliminary stage before any evidence is heard. However, Chairperson Wright was careful to point out that it is for the HRTO to determine if it will consider a request for summary dismissal part-way through a hearing.
The Chairperson commented at paragraph 20 that the "reasonable prospect of success" test was more appropriate in the context of a Rule 19A hearing than the traditional test of a prima facie case:
[…] when a general evaluation of the evidence that has been called and is proposed to be called makes it clear that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success the Application should be dismissed. This is a principled test that is consistent with the Code, and that incorporates the concept of prima facie case. I think that it is usually more understandable, accessible and flexible to consider the issues and evidence against a general test of reasonable prospect of success.
According to the Tribunal, if during the hearing it becomes apparent that there remains only a theoretical prospect that evidence could meet an applicant's burden of proof will come forward, the application must be dismissed.
In that case, Mr. Pellerin, a school principal, made a number of allegations against his supervisor
Ms. Francella, a superintendent for the school board. These allegations included discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisals for a previous human rights complaint. It was the applicant's evidence that Ms. Francella criticized him, placed expectations on him not placed on other principals, and undermined his credibility with staff. Further, Ms. Francella had tried to make him resign because he had major depressive disorder and had previously complained to the OHRC.
The respondents took the position that Ms. Francella's actions were legitimate supervision of Mr.
Pellerin's job performance and had no connection with his disability or prior Code complaint. It was agreed by the parties that Ms. Francella's evidence would be heard first. After hearing this evidence and the applicant's theory and intended evidence, Chairperson Wright was satisfied that 92 Pellerin, see note 38.
there was no reasonable prospect that the applicant could prove discrimination or reprisal.
Chairperson Wright commented that when an applicant has had a chance to fully outline the evidence they intend to call and to explain the basis upon which his or her application could succeed, and it is clear that there is no reasonable prospect of establishing a Code violation, the application should be dismissed.
Another example of the HRTO of a summary dismissal is Abdul v. York University. 93 There, the applicant alleged discrimination on various grounds against York University and University of Waterloo. The applicant alleged that her failure to be offered a position for which she interviewed at York, and to obtain an interview for an advertised position at Waterloo, was tainted by discrimination. The HRTO directed that a joint summary hearing be held with respect to both applications. The HRTO's "case assessment direction" noted that the application did not appear to provide a factual or evidentiary basis for the applicant's belief that she was discriminated against.
At the summary hearing, the applicant was required to explain exactly how she could prove that she experienced discrimination. She was unable to do so; rather, she could only provide speculation as to the reasons for the universities' conduct. The HRTO found nothing in the applicant's materials that could support her allegations. As such the application against both universities was dismissed.
The HRTO has been willing to grant summary dismissal under Rule 19A where it is clear from previous jurisprudence that the application has no reasonable prospect of success. For example, several applications have been summarily dismissed when the applicant alleged discrimination by his or her union for failing to proceed with a grievance. However, when credibility issues arise directly from the central issue raised in the complaint, the Tribunal will decline to issue summary judgment, and will instead proceed to a full hearing.
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As suggested by Chairperson Wright in Dabic, 99 the HRTO's jurisprudence regarding summary dismissals will develop as more parties seek access to this potentially cost-and time-saving feature of the Rules.
Deferral of applications
Section 45 allows the HRTO to defer an application in accordance with the Rules. Rule 14 provides that the HRTO can defer consideration of an application "on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, or at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party."
Given the broad scope of Rule 14, one must look to the HRTO's jurisprudence to determine the grounds upon which a deferral may be granted. In Baghdasserians v. 674469 Ontario 100 the HRTO enumerated some of the factors that it would take into account when deciding whether or not to defer an application. These include:
 the subject matter of the other proceeding;
 the nature of the other proceeding;
 the type of remedies available in the other proceeding; and  whether, having regard to the status of each proceeding and steps taken to pursue them, it would be fair overall to the parties to defer the application. 101 the HRTO refused to defer the application. The applicant had been terminated from employment and consequently lost his health benefits coverage. His wife was terminally ill and required medical treatment, and the grievance arbitration relating to his termination was proceeding slowly. The HRTO held that deferral would be unfair to the applicant. Notably, in obiter, the HRTO pointed out that it would generally defer an application where there was an ongoing grievance arbitration based on the same facts and issues.
In Monck v. Ford Motor Company of Canada
Motions for non-suit
A motion for non-suit is generally brought by a respondent at the close of the applicant's evidence. By bringing a non-suit motion, the respondent is alleging that the facts as established by the applicant, taken at their strongest, do not demonstrate an infringement of the Code. That is, a prima facie case has not been established.
The HRTO has considered whether the strict common law rule should be applied in the human rights context. Unfortunately, the HRTO has not developed a consistent approach. Its decision in Modi v. Paradise Fine Foods Ltd. 102 highlights the lack of a unified approach. In Modi, counsel for the respondent indicated that he would be making a motion for non-suit at the end of the OHRC's case. Counsel for the respondent sought a reassurance from the HRTO that he could make such a motion without prejudice to his right to call evidence. The HRTO granted this reassurance, and later issued reasons for this decision. In these reasons, the HRTO noted that there was no consensus in human rights jurisprudence as to whether the rule requiring the foregoing of the right to call evidence was applicable to human rights proceedings. The HRTO noted that there were two principle concerns with allowing a respondent to make a non-suit motion without foregoing the normal right to call evidence. Firstly, it is potentially prejudicial to the applicant for the HRTO to entertain the respondent's motion without the benefit of the respondent's evidence. The applicant may obtain useful admissions from the respondent's witnesses and this evidence may assist the applicant's case. The second concern is that the fairness of the proceeding is risked if an adjudicator comments on the evidence of one side before the other side has presented its evidence.
In Modi, the HRTO dismissed these concerns, stating that a decision that the applicant has, through its evidence, passed the "relatively low threshold" of establishing a prima facie case, did not carry with it any strong pronouncement on the merits of the case or, more particularly, how the adjudicator would view or evaluate the testimony supporting the complainant once the testimony for the respondents has been heard. The HRTO also noted that a strict application of the common law rule would dissuade respondents from bringing motions for non-suit, which was detrimental to the administration of the human rights regime because unmeritorious cases may continue to a full hearing.
Thus, the respondent was not put to an election and was able to bring a motion for non-suit without prejudice to its right to call evidence should that motion fail (which it did).
On the basis of Modi, and the cases considered therein, it appears that the strict common law rule will not always be applied by the HRTO. Rather, a balancing will take place between the possible prejudice to the applicant from the HRTO hearing and determining a motion to dismiss before the respondent has called evidence, and the unfairness of continuing with a hearing if the respondent can establish that there is insufficient evidence to support the applicant's case.
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Judicial review
What happens to HRTO proceedings when a preliminary decision is judicially reviewed? Is it automatically stayed, or does the party seeking the review have to obtain a stay?
Section 25 Statutory Powers and Procedures Act provides that:
Appeal operates as stay, exception 25.
(1) An appeal from a decision of a tribunal to a court or other appellate body operates as a stay in the matter unless, (a) another Act or a regulation that applies to the proceeding expressly provides to the contrary; or (b) the tribunal or the court or other appellate body orders otherwise.
(2) An application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, or the bringing of proceedings specified in subsection 2 (1) of that Act is not an appeal within the meaning of subsection (1).
Thus, the judicial review of an HRTO decision does not automatically stay the HRTO proceeding. 104 The question is therefore in what circumstances will the HRTO stay its own proceedings?
In Snow 105 the respondents sought a stay of the HRTO proceedings to pursue a judicial review of the OHRC's decision to refer the complaint to the HRTO. The HRTO held that an adjournment of its proceedings pending judicial review of the OHRC's decision was an "extraordinary remedy," such that the party requesting it must clearly demonstrate that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the granting of a stay.
In Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board 106 the OHRT stated that:
In general, an application for judicial review does not operate as a stay of a Tribunal decision.
[…] Nonetheless, for a stay to be granted, the respondents must establish: (1) that there is a serious issue to be tried; (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the stay.
(emphasis added)
In general, courts are reluctant to hear applications for judicial review of interim or preliminary discretionary decisions of a tribunal like the HRTO. 107 There is a well established practice of allowing the process before a tribunal to run to completion before entertaining an application for judicial review. Generally, the court will only interfere on a preliminary issue if the tribunal has lost, or never had, jurisdiction. 108 However, in Trozzi, the Court decided that since the HRTO's decision to deny the section 45.1 Request to dismiss the application would result in a long, complicated and costly hearing, it made sense to entertain the judicial review application in order to avoid embarking on that process.
Conclusion regarding summary dismissal requests before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
In light of the fact that the HRTO is now a direct access tribunal, it has at its disposal a number of means for dealing with applications on a summary basis. Counsel for respondents would do well to consider these means of avoiding the time-consuming process of litigating matters that do not warrant full scale hearings. Even if the request does not result in the dismissal of the entire application, it may well result in streamlining or limiting the scope of the application to the essential issues. For example, a request to strike untimely allegations may result in a substantial reduction in the time and expense of responding to an application. Counsel for applicants must be prepared to meet the challenges of requests for summary dismissals
PART TWO Summary Dismissal under the Canadian Human Rights Act -Federal Considerations
Overview of federal human rights process
Respondents to complaints in the federal arena have opportunities to make early objections to the validity of the complaint at key points in both the Canadian Human Rights Commission Section 41(1) provides that the CHRC may determine that it will not deal with a complaint on the grounds that the complainant ought to pursue the complaint through other means such as a grievance procedure or pursuant to another act, the complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the CHRC, the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith, or the complaint is based on acts or omissions the last of which occurred more than one year before receipt of the complaint.
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If the CHRC decides to deal with the complaint, there is a second opportunity for early dismissal at the end of the CHRC's investigation process, when the CHRC must determine whether or not the matter merits further inquiry by the CHRT. Section 44 of the CHRA creates this further opportunity, once the matter has been thoroughly investigated, for the CHRC to determine that the matter ought to be dealt with through an alternate and preferable procedure, or that a hearing before the CHRT is not warranted, or that the complaint should be dismissed because it is not within the CHRT's jurisdiction, it is frivolous and vexatious or it is out of time.
If the CHRC refers the complaint to the CHRT for a hearing, a respondent may raise certain preliminary objections, and seek a summary dismissal before the CHRT. The various grounds for early dismissal before the CHRC and CHRT are explored in further detail below.
The CHRC's powers
The CHRC may decide not to deal with a complaint or, having investigated it, the CHRC may decide that an inquiry by the CHRT is not warranted. The grounds upon which the CHRC may rely are the same at both stages in the CHRCs process: when it considers whether to investigate and, having investigated, when it determines whether an inquiry by the CHRT is warranted.
Preferable procedure
When the CHRC decides not to deal with a complaint because a preferable procedure for redress exists, it will defer its decision until the other adjudicative process has been exhausted and the outcome is known. Code adjudicator must decline to hear a human rights complaint if another substantially similar complaint has been filed under the CHRA or, in the event that no complaint has been initiated under the CHRA, if the Labour Code unjust dismissal complaint raises human rights issues which could reasonably constitute a basis for a substantially similar complaint under the CHRA.
However, if the CHRC, in the exercise of its statutory discretion under either section 41(1)(b) or section 44(2)(b) of the CHRA, refers a complaint to a Labour Code adjudicator, then the adjudicator would have the authority to hear and decide the human rights allegations to the extent that they relate to the unjust dismissal which the adjudicator is appointed to adjudicate.
Therefore, according to MacFarlane, the question of whether a section 242(1) Labour Code adjudicator can properly assert jurisdiction over an unjust dismissal complaint alleging human rights violations depends on the manner in which the complaint comes before the adjudicator.
Unless the matter is referred to the adjudicator by the CHRC pursuant to sections 41(1)(b) or 44(2)(b), the adjudicator must decline to hear such a complaint.
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The practical implication of this decision is that if parties wish to have the matter dealt with by a
Code adjudicator rather than the CHRC and CHRT, they should first request that the Commission exercise its discretion under section 41(1)(b) to defer to the Code adjudicator. there is no obligation to consider the matter of a remedy; its task is solely to determine whether the facts warrant referring the complaint to the CHRT.
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CHRC lacks jurisdiction
Constitutional jurisdiction
In order to deal with any complaint, the CHRC must be satisfied that the matter falls within the complaint does not disclose a violation of the Act. When the CHRC dismisses a complaint prior to an investigation, the substance of the allegations must be accepted as true. Where it is plain and obvious, accepting the allegations, that the complaint cannot succeed, an investigation is not Specifically, s. 41(1)(c) provides that "the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that ... the complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission". The use of the words "it appears to the Commission" infers the exercise of discretion.
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If the CHRC decides to deal with a complaint at the outset, it may nonetheless determine at the conclusion of the investigation that no inquiry is warranted based on jurisdictional grounds if the investigation failed to establish a sufficient connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination. Just as there must be a sufficient connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination to found jurisdiction, the complaint must relate to a discriminatory practice, within the scope of the CHRA.
Section 5 of the Act prohibits discrimination "in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to the general public." Section 7 of the CHRA prohibits discrimination in "employment". A complaint is beyond the CHRC's jurisdiction if it does not relate to one of these practices.
Definition of "employment" To fulfill the remedial purpose of human rights legislation, courts and tribunals have attributed a considerably broader meaning to the words "employ" and "employment" than the technical definition of master and servant used in other areas of employment law. Human rights cases provincially and federally have consistently defined "employ" as meaning "to utilize". Provincially, several cases have held that volunteer activities may fall within the definition of "employment" under human rights legislation. 134 Despite this broadly encompassing interpretation of section 7, a complaint will not be within the CHRC's jurisdiction if no employment relationship exists and a complaint may be dismissed on this basis.
Definition of "service customarily available to the public" Several cases have explored the meaning of a "service customarily available to the public."
Whether or not the alleged discrimination relates to a "service" within the meaning of the CHRA is an important question for respondents to consider and raise early in the CHRC's proceedings.
It is also a legal question that may be raised before the CHRT, (although, as discussed below, this question will not always lend itself to a preliminary motion depending on the evidence required for the CHRT to make such a determination).
There is no definition of the term "services customarily offered to the general public" in the CHRA. However, the Supreme Court has stated that in determining whether a particular activity is a "service customarily available to the general public" the following two questions must be answered:
1 is the activity a service; and 2 is the service "customarily available to the public" in that it creates a public relationship between the service provider and the service user?
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The Federal Court has held that the term "services" in section 5 of the CHRA contemplates something of benefit being "held out" and "offered" to the public. 136 The Court noted that "services" provide an improvement, benefit or assistance to people. In addition to determining whether the alleged "service" holds out something of benefit or assistance to the general public, one must also inquire whether that benefit or assistance was the essential nature of the activity.
137
Where the federal government is the respondent, cases holding that not everything the government does is a "service" are instructive. 138 The enactment of regulations by a government agency, 139 certain of the CRA's tax assessment actions, 140 and the government's enforcement actions 141 are not "services." On the other hand, the Court has observed that nearly everything the government does is for the public and is therefore "customarily available to the general public" within the meaning of section 5 of the Act.
142
With respect to the requirement that the service be "generally available to the public," the CHRT in Dreaver v. Pankiew stated that a service by any public body will generally meet the test of being customarily available to the public. 143 Even a "targeted" service may fall under the meaning of a "service available to the general public." In Crockford v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 144 the B.C. Court recognized that every service has its own public, which can rightly be defined through eligibility criteria. Such criteria are necessary to ensure that the services reach their intended beneficiaries, thereby avoiding the unnecessary depletion of scarce resources. 145 The Federal Court has echoed the view that "each service has its own public and that once that public is defined, it is prohibited to establish distinctions within that public." 
Trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith
The CHRC may choose not to deal with or refer a matter that is "trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith" pursuant to section 41(1)(d) of the CHRA. This ground for dismissal encompasses a broad range of objections to a complaint. A complaint may be considered "trivial, vexatious and made in bad faith" when it is "plain and obvious" on the evidence that it cannot succeed, 147 or because it has been fully addressed in other proceedings, or has been finally resolved through a settlement agreement.
It is "plain and obvious" a complaint cannot succeed when the evidence fails to disclose any connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination, or otherwise lacks an essential element required by the CHRA.
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The CHRC may properly dismiss a complaint under section 41(1)(d) if it has been dealt with and disposed of by the decision of another administrative body or grievance process. The concept of a "frivolous or vexatious" proceeding is thus closely bound up with the principle of abuse of process. Before dismissing a complaint on this basis, the CHRC must review the evidence itself and make its own decision as to the proper disposition of the case. The CHRC must turn its mind to the findings of fact and credibility that were made by the decision-maker in order to determine whether the proceedings fully addressed the human rights complaint. In short, the CHRC cannot simply "rubber-stamp" the decision of another board or decision-making body.
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Similarly, where an applicant has signed a settlement or compromise agreement releasing its employer from any grievances or complaints and then subsequently files a complaint with the CHRC, it is open to the CHRC, upon reviewing the relevant facts and evidence surrounding the making of the agreement, to find that the applicant's complaint is vexatious or made in bad faith.
150
Timeliness
Pursuant to section 41(1)(e) of the CHRA, the CHRC has the authority to dismiss a complaint where the complaint is based on acts and omissions the last of which occurred more than one year before the filing of the complaint.
In seeking an extension of the time to bring the complaint, the onus is on the complainant to demonstrate by "providing persuasive and compelling reasons for the CHRC to exercise its discretion" that the complaint should proceed. 151 Once the complaint is filed with the CHRC, the respondent may seek to have it dismissed or the CHRC may do so on its accord.  the breadth of the CHRC's discretion under section 41(1)(e);
 the length of the delay;
 the resulting prejudice to the respondent; and  the active pursuit by the complainant of other forms of redress before filing a complaint.
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The CHRC may additionally look at whether the delay was incurred as a result of bad faith or whether there would be any unfairness or the respondent would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. 153 In determining whether the respondent would be prejudiced by the delay, evidence is required about the availability of records and witnesses and the respondent's ability to answer the complaint.
Where a complaint is based upon some allegations which are timely and others which are not, and the allegations do not form a single continuous series of events, the CHRC may exercise its discretion to pare down the complaint by severing only those distinct allegations which are out of time.
154
The CHRT's summary dismissal powers
Once the CHRC requests the CHRT to conduct an inquiry, the grounds upon which summary dismissal is available become considerably more narrow. The enumerated grounds for dismissing a complaint set out in section 41(1) of the CHRA do not apply to the CHRT and the CHRT lacks jurisdiction to rely on these statutory grounds to dismiss a complaint. Moreover, the CHRT does not have the jurisdiction to review the CHRC's decision that an inquiry is warranted. 155 If a respondent believes the CHRC erred in referring a complaint to the CHRT because, for example, it believes the complaint is frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith, the respondent must seek redress in the Federal Court by way of a judicial review of the CHRC's decision. Before the CHRT, such arguments may generally only be raised as defences. It the complaint is truly frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith, the CHRT may dismiss the complaint as being unsubstantiated once it has heard all the evidence.
156
As a creature of statute, any power the CHRT has to dismiss a complaint without holding a full hearing must be found in the CHRA. The CHRT is guided by the legislative directive to "conduct an inquiry" and give parties a "full and ample opportunity" to present evidence and make representations, provided in section 50(1) of the CHRA. Section 53(1) provides that "[a]t the conclusion of an inquiry, the member or panel conducting the inquiry shall dismiss the complaint if the member or panel finds that the complaint is not substantiated."
The CHRT's authority to consider preliminary motions for dismissal arises from sections 50(2) and 50(3)(e), which provide that the CHRT may decide "all questions of law or fact necessary to determining the matter" and "any procedural or evidentiary question arising during the hearing".
In Cremasco, the Federal Court held that the choice of the word "inquiry" instead of "hearing" in the legislation indicates that the referral of a matter to the CHRT does not necessarily have to result in a hearing in every case. 157 The Court held in that case that "it would seem to be perfectly proper for the CHRT, at the outset of an inquiry, to entertain preliminary motions so as to clear the procedural underbrush." 158 Nonetheless, the CHRT has held that given its statutory mandate to give the parties a "full and ample" opportunity to be heard, the power to entertain preliminary motions for dismissal must be used cautiously and only in the most exceptional circumstances. 159 Such exceptional circumstances may arise where the determination of a pure question of law, or a question of law that rests upon undisputed facts, would dispose of the case without the need for any further evidence. 160 Summary dismissal motions may also be heard to determine whether procedural delays have resulted in a violation of section 7 of the Charter (in accordance with
Blencoe, 161 whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, 162 or if conducting an inquiry would amount to an abuse of process. 163 Caution and restraint must be used in the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the context of human rights complaints, since the dismissal of a complaint results in a denial of the opportunity to be heard. Tribunal found that it would be an abuse of process to re-litigate the matter.
Issue estoppel
In Cremasco, 165 the CHRT stated that when it rules on a res judicata motion, this ruling is not a review of the CHRC's decision to refer the complaint to the CHRT. The issue is whether it would be an abuse of the CHRT's process to rehear a matter that has been determined in another forum, not whether it was an abuse of the CHRC's process to have referred a complaint.
The key to the Court's decision in Cremasco is that the Tribunal, as master of its own process, has an obligation to ensure that its processes are not abused. If the circumstances of the case are such that it would be an abuse of process or contrary to the interests of justice for the case to be heard by the Tribunal, then the Tribunal may refuse to hear the case even if the Commission has referred it to the Tribunal.
166
Where the same or related issues have been resolved in prior proceedings, the CHRT applies the common law doctrine of issue estoppel, in determining whether it ought to proceed with its own hearing. The following three elements must exist for the doctrine to apply: 167 a) the same issue(s) have been decided in both proceedings (the determination of the issue in the first litigation must have been necessary to the result 168 ) b) the prior judicial decision was final c) same parties or their privies (for parties to be privy there must be a sufficient degree of common interest between the party and the privy to make it fair to bind the party to the 164 Cremasco, see note 2, at para. 83. 165 Cremasco, see note 2. Even if each of these requirements for issue estoppel is satisfied, the CHRT must consider whether to exercise its discretion to apply it. 171 Certain unique considerations arise in the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel in the context of human rights proceedings. First, where the CHRC is a party in the proceedings before the CHRT, the requirement for "mutuality of the parties" will not be met, if the CHRC was not a party in the prior proceeding.
172 Mutuality of the parties may similarly not be met where the prior proceeding was a labour arbitration in which the complainant was represented by a union, whereas the complainant advances his or her case as an individual in the human rights process.
173
The CHRT will conduct a review of the prior proceeding to determine whether the complainant's human rights issues were squarely before the other decision-maker.
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Abuse of process
Where the three elements of issue estoppel are not met under a strict application of the doctrine, the CHRT may nonetheless dismiss a matter that has been resolved in another forum based on the more general principle that it would be an abuse of its process to continue with the hearing. The While the CHRT cannot sit in review of the CHRC's decision to extend the time limit for filing a complaint, 176 it may rely upon the doctrine of abuse of process to conclude that a matter ought to be dismissed because procedural delays have created prejudice of sufficient magnitude to impact on the fairness of the hearing. 177 Similarly, abuse of process may be raised where the matters at issue have already been finally resolved in a settlement agreement. 178 In every case, the party seeking summary dismissal has the burden of demonstrating that the question lends itself to a motion and does not require a full hearing of the evidence to be decided.
179
Effect of filing a judicial review application
A party seeking judicial review of the CHRC's decision to refer a matter to the CHRT for an inquiry will invariably want that inquiry to be suspended pending the outcome of the Federal Court's decision on the application. The CHRT generally will not stay its proceedings simply because an application before the Federal Court raises issues as to whether an inquiry is warranted. The CHRT is not bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's test for granting a stay of proceedings, set out in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General). 180 Rather, the a power can be inferred.
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The RJR-Macdonald approach has been rejected by the CHRT in a number of cases where the imperatives of natural justice required the CHRT's proceedings to continue, notwithstanding the existence of an outstanding judicial review application. 183 A party seeking a stay of the CHRT's process pending the outcome of the judicial review application may instead apply to the Federal Court for an order staying the CHRT's proceedings until the judicial review application has been determined.
Motions for non-suit
As in the provincial context, a motion for non-suit may be made at the conclusion of the complainant's case and is based on the argument that a prima facie case of discrimination has not been made out. There is a certain degree of inconsistency at the federal level, as well as the provincial level as to whether the respondent will be required to forego the right to call evidence if the motion is unsuccessful. 184 the CHRT considered whether a respondent should be required to elect to not call evidence before making its motion for non-suit. Previous cases went either way: in some, the respondent had to make the election 185 while in others, the respondent did not. 186 In still others, the case simply proceeded directly to hearing the motion for non-suit or dismissal because the election issue was not raised.
In Chopra v. British Columbia (Department of National Health & Welfare),
187
In Chopra, the CHRT followed the approach taken by the HRTO in Nimako 188 and concluded that the common law rule of election applied. The Tribunal wanted to avoid the "tails I win, heads you lose" approach if the respondent were not required to elect. It referred to a passage in
Nimako that explained that it is only upon the completion of the whole case that a tribunal is in a position to weigh the evidence and come to a decision, and it may happen that evidence adduced from witnesses called on behalf of a respondent tips the scales against him or her. There is also discussion of the difficulties human rights complainants may face in accessing all the information relevant to establishing discrimination, and this is especially so in the workplace.
However, the application of the rule may be waived by the complainant or the rule may not apply where there are exceptional circumstances. The Tribunal held that the challenge is to strike a balance between the possible prejudice to the complainant from the Tribunal hearing and deciding a motion to dismiss at an early stage in the proceedings versus the unfairness of continuing with a hearing if the respondent can make the case that there is not enough evidence to continue. 189 There were no special circumstances in this case; neither the questions of time nor of expense justified a derogation from the basic principle and therefore the Tribunal held that the respondent could proceed with its motion to dismiss the complaint only if it elected to not call any evidence.
In terms of the prima facie case which must be proven, the Tribunal held that it is not to assess or weigh the evidence. "If there is some evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could believe and accept to establish the complaint alleged, then a prima facie case has been made out and the motion should be dismissed." 190 Thus, any concerns regarding the respondent "testing the waters" or "taking the temperature" and determining how well it has addressed the complaint against it thus far are avoided because the Tribunal is not required to assess the complainant's evidence.
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In Filgueira v. Garfield Container Transport Inc., 192 the CHRT did not put the respondent to an election when it brought its motion for non-suit. It also rejected the notion that not requiring a party to elect allows them to "take the temperature" since there is no weighing of the evidence and nothing to comment on if the application fails. The issues of costs and whether the motion is brought in good faith may be considered when determining if there are special circumstances that would warrant not requiring the election.
In reviewing the decision in Filgueira, the Federal Court held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to dismiss a complaint by way of an application for non-suit. The Court stated that the requirement as to the election is a matter of procedure and not a matter of law or of natural justice. The Court held that "tribunals should be allowed reasonable latitude when it comes to procedure provided that it does not amount to error of law or a breach of natural justice". 193 The Court held that the Tribunal had "weighed the relevant factors," made a procedural decision, and that this was not a determination that should be overturned on a judicial review even if the reviewing court would have ruled otherwise. Also, the Court confirmed that there is in fact no "taking of the temperature" since there is no weighing or assessment of the evidence at this stage. Moreover, in terms of the prima facie case, the Court held that a motion for non-suit can be granted even where there is some evidence but it is "weak", "not appreciable" or "so minimal as to have no effect in law." Tribunal stated that the Court's reasons in Filgueira does not establish that respondents should never be put to an election but that the election issue should be decided depending on the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal concluded that there were no special circumstances here to justify not putting the respondent to the election.
Thus, it is clear that there is no pattern to follow on non-suit motions. Whether the respondent will be put to an election will depend on the facts of each case, the member hearing the case and the strength of counsel's arguments. While in some cases, it may make sense to make a motion 193 Filgueira, see note 192, at para 22.
194 Filgueira, see note 192, at para 31. for non-suit, and a motion for non-suit is likely a rarer occurrence before the CHRT than the HRTO, most complaints with weak prima facie cases will have been dismissed by the Commission or settled, leaving only the more challenging cases to be heard. In those cases, respondents may be less willing to take the risk of being put to an election in a motion for nonsuit.
Conclusion
It is always worthwhile at the outset of a case, to review whether there are grounds to bring a motion or a request for summary dismissal. Even if the complaint is not dismissed in its entirety, the sope of the complaint may be significantly narrowed. This will ensure not only that the parties' resources are wisely spent, but also that the scarce resources of the tribunals established to deal with human rights complaints are not wasted on spurious allegations or complaints that are outside the tribunal's jurisdiction.
